Your Aversion To Determinism Is Itself Predetermined

[boost]

Finding root causes is a frustrating affair since all causal regressions are functionally infinite. This frustration understandably lends itself to a pragmatic, but arbitrary point being chosen as the initial link in the causal chain. This point almost always is characterized as a prime mover by way of the move being initiated through an entity's free will. Because of bias, this arbitrary point ends up being a point which suits the observer's interests, which will have their narrative diverge (drastically in some cases) from that of observers whose interests conflict.

We're watching different movies because we can't square our pragmatic need for freewill, our individual biases, and a determined universe.

[BananaStand]

so many colors man......

Do my hands look weird......

Got any food??? Preferably....spaghettios?

[boost]

so many colors man......

Do my hands look weird......

Got any food??? Preferably....spaghettios?

There are plenty of threads in which your lack of curiosity about the world and your deficient intellect renders you perfectly capable of treading water.

[Poopadoop]

There are plenty of threads in which your lack of curiosity about the world and your deficient intellect renders you perfectly capable of treading water.

Yeah, but don't imagine that's going to stop him from posting in this one.

[Poopadoop]

Finding root causes is a frustrating affair since all causal regressions are functionally infinite. This frustration understandably lends itself to a pragmatic, but arbitrary point being chosen as the initial link in the causal chain. This point almost always is characterized as a prime mover by way of the move being initiated through an entity's free will. Because of bias, this arbitrary point ends up being a point which suits the observer's interests, which will have their narrative diverge (drastically in some cases) from that of observers whose interests conflict.

We're watching different movies because we can't square our pragmatic need for freewill, our individual biases, and a determined universe.

I'm not sure free will plays into it. One could be a hard determinist and still have an idiosyncratic, subjective view on what's happening.

I also question whether we have a 'pragmatic need' for free will. I think we have a natural tendency to believe in it because it matches our phenomonology - "Why did I do that? Because I decided to" is a much more straightforward chain of thought than "I did it because of neural processes over which I have no control."

[OngBonga]

Does anyone want to play chess?

[boost]

I'm not sure free will plays into it. One could be a hard determinist and still have an idiosyncratic, subjective view on what's happening.

True, and I may have focused too much on free will, but then again I think it ultimately does come to free will in a roundabout way. So the idea that things could have been different necessitates free will if you dig deep enough. What else would have provided a fork in the road?

I also question whether we have a 'pragmatic need' for free will. I think we have a natural tendency to believe in it because it matches our phenomonology - "Why did I do that? Because I decided to" is a much more straightforward chain of thought than "I did it because of neural processes over which I have no control."

I don't disagree that we have an innate tendency to believe we have free will, but in the context of trying to find root causes of current events, I think we are in abstract enough territory that our predisposition to believe in free will isn't really at play, or is to a lesser degree.

Maybe the point I'm trying to make is that all histories start with an action of free will, and which action we chose(lol) as the starting point sets a bias for what follows-- and maybe I'm simply proposing that it be more common to include a caveat that the prime mover was actually not so, and that the prime mover themselves have a robust history.

The time travel to assassinate Hitler thought experiment comes to mind. If he's already Chancellor, it's likely far too late, but if he's just a baby, you're committing infanticide. That distinction belies the truth that even Hitler has a history that combined to become his actions.

[boost]

Does anyone want to play chess?

Kinda.

But you're really good, and I really am not.

[OngBonga]

My mockery was perhaps too subtle.

You guys seem to be trying really hard to use intelligent words, just for the sake of using them. When I want to flex my intellect, I remind people I'm good at chess, because everyone knows that good chess players are smart.

Honestly, I read your OP with a spliff, and by the time I finshed reading it, I had absolutely no idea what the subject matter was. I felt stupider, so I had to flex my intellect by reminding you how good I am at chess.

[MadMojoMonkey]

It seems, though is not proven when it comes to human affairs, that if we could fully understand any given moment, then we would, by definition, understand all the necessary and sufficient events which lead to that moment, and would therefore include all the nec and suf information to forecast the influences of that moment on future events.

However, that kind of understanding is beyond human capacity (I suspect), and the assertion that anyone could fully understand a moment with all it's history and implications is impractical.

Yet, we assert that we understand our world, perhaps as a coping mechanism, when literally all the evidence is that we barely understand our area of greatest expertise. Why would we understand things which we are not experts at more than that? We don't, but we tell ourselves that we are (more) expert in things which are not our direct passion, the one topic about which we know the most and are humbled at how little we know about it.

Humans are odd.

@ong: you would trounce me in a dozen moves. Even if the game wasn't technically over by that point, you'd be mopping me up.

[wufwugy]

Maybe the point I'm trying to make is that all histories start with an action of free will, and which action we chose(lol) as the starting point sets a bias for what follows-- and maybe I'm simply proposing that it be more common to include a caveat that the prime mover was actually not so, and that the prime mover themselves have a robust history.

This sounds like a biased causal chain instead of a deterministic one.

[boost]

My mockery was perhaps too subtle.

Nah, I was just giving you the point

Honestly, I read your OP with a spliff, and by the time I finshed reading it, I had absolutely no idea what the subject matter was. I felt stupider

That's kinda how I felt writing it...

If I think back, I had the thought that people's aversion to determinism could be a root of a lot of problems if determinism is the way of the universe. I just wrote too much instead of plopping the idea out there for discussion. Maybe, either way, it's just not that interesting of a thought. *shrug*

[boost]

It seems, though is not proven when it comes to human affairs, that if we could fully understand any given moment, then we would, by definition, understand all the necessary and sufficient events which lead to that moment, and would therefore include all the nec and suf information to forecast the influences of that moment on future events.

However, that kind of understanding is beyond human capacity (I suspect), and the assertion that anyone could fully understand a moment with all it's history and implications is impractical.

Yet, we assert that we understand our world, perhaps as a coping mechanism, when literally all the evidence is that we barely understand our area of greatest expertise. Why would we understand things which we are not experts at more than that? We don't, but we tell ourselves that we are (more) expert in things which are not our direct passion, the one topic about which we know the most and are humbled at how little we know about it.

Humans are odd.

@ong: you would trounce me in a dozen moves. Even if the game wasn't technically over by that point, you'd be mopping me up.

I want to add something to this, but I've got nothing-- just wanted to say that I enjoyed the post.

[boost]

This sounds like a biased causal chain instead of a deterministic one.

I'm not following, but I'd like to.

[wufwugy]

I'm not following, but I'd like to.

Decisions could exist within a probability field, where an effect might never be determined 100% by its causes. There could be a range of effects with a range of probabilities that derive from the causes that come before.

If decisions are viewed as if they are chemistry or similar, they probably look determined. But I'm not sure decisions should be viewed like that. For all we know the causal chain of complex organisms contains randomness or something else.

If at a later date we perfectly model the universe and perfectly model causality, we might find ourselves saying things like this: "well in this situation the entity says yes 84% of the time and no 16% of the time".

[MadMojoMonkey]

[...] if determinism is the way of the universe.

Well... it's complicated. We need to be careful about how we define and use the word "determinism" in this context.

The universe is deterministic within a rigidly defined spread of probabilistic "allowed" outcomes.

If at a later date we perfectly model the universe and perfectly model causality, we might find ourselves saying things like this: "well in this situation the entity says yes 84% of the time and no 16% of the time".

This is pretty much what QM has revealed to us.

For the systems which we can model perfectly, we see exactly this kind of causality. There are certain "allowed" evolutions of the prepared system, and those outcomes will happen at very well-defined probabilities. Plenty of systems will have only 1 allowed future, which happens at 100%, but plenty systems are not so straight-forward.

[boost]

Yeah, looks like I conflated a lack of freewill with a determined universe.

But even with the quirkiness of quarks, there is no obvious place to rest the claim that we exert agency over our decisions.

And even then, I think I may have layered the explicit reference to freewill onto this idea unnecessarily. The key point is that the causal regression is functionally infinite. Picking a starting point is prone to being influenced by bias, and even when there is no bias, the starting point itself will bias the following narrative.

[MadMojoMonkey]

But even with the quirkiness of quarks, there is no obvious place to rest the claim that we exert agency over our decisions.

Quite the opposite.

The QM description of particles and their interactions and evolution applies to the particles which make a brain. That description would be different if agency mattered. The predicted probabilities would not be observed.

I.e. if QM predicts something in a brain will happen at X%, without invoking any agency of mind, then evidence of the mind having agency would be to observe anything other than X%. If the QM description is enough, which all current experiments fail to show evidence that it isn't, then the claim that we exert agency is on paper thin ice.

If we never observe any particle interactions which are not in line with the predicted "allowed" outcomes and their associated probabilities of QM, then what possible influence could we exert?

(Just for clarity, we commonly use the term allowed state in QM, but we have to be careful that we mean "allowed by the axioms of QM," and not "given permission.")

[boost]

Quite the opposite.

I'm a bit confused. Everything that follows seems to back up my claim that we lack agency. Did I miss a double negative somewhere?

[Poopadoop]

I'm a bit confused. Everything that follows seems to back up my claim that we lack agency. Did I miss a double negative somewhere?

I think he's saying 'if we could show probabilistic events were affected by agency, we could prove agency' or something like that. So, we could prove agency in theory.

[boost]

This tangent is getting pretty off topic, but whatever, it's probably more interesting than whatever the topic actually was.

we could prove agency in theory.

It's a bit cyclical-- quantum probability (if that's a phrase) is being posited as a potential source of freewill. If you need to reach outside of the quarks doing quirky things to say that some other phenomenon is influencing the probability of which quirky thing they do, well, you now are saying that freewill is not born of the quarky quirks, but instead just influences them. That puts you squarely back in square one.

[Poopadoop]

This tangent is getting pretty off topic, but whatever, it's probably more interesting than whatever the topic actually was.

It's a bit cyclical-- quantum probability (if that's a phrase) is being posited as a potential source of freewill. If you need to reach outside of the quarks doing quirky things to say that some other phenomenon is influencing the probability of which quirky thing they do, well, you now are saying that freewill is not born of the quarky quirks, but instead just influences them. That puts you squarely back in square one.

I agree. "QM free will" only changes how free will operates; it brings us no closer to answering the question of whether or not it exists or where it comes from.

[MadMojoMonkey]

I'm a bit confused. Everything that follows seems to back up my claim that we lack agency. Did I miss a double negative somewhere?

The sense I meant it is "no obvious place to rest the claim [...]" should be replaced with "indication [...] is not the case."

It's poorly worded. I almost changed it days ago, but no one was calling me out on it, so I guessed that it wasn't as misleading as I was reading it.

[MadMojoMonkey]

Hmm.

quantum probability (if that's a phrase) is being posited as a potential source of freewill.

If there is anything acting on matter/energy wave/particles, then QM has some predictions to make about it. IF those predictions don't need to be altered AND free will exists, THEN sure, the quirkiness of quarks is likely the cause, BUT, that means free will does not mean an ability to change particle interactions. So if we can't affect anything on the smallest scales, then what is free will? That's a new question, not the original question.


If you need to reach outside of the quarks doing quirky things to say that some other phenomenon is influencing the probability of which quirky thing they do

We don't; every known experiment is in line with the current theory. There is no need to invoke any further axioms to explain the current data (for physics in brains... not quantum-relativistic stuff). If new data comes to light, then we'll re-evaluate at that time, but whatever new discovery needs to be explained can't change the current data. The current data is showing no evidence that QM is incorrect (incomplete, but nowhere incorrect). Whatever new data comes to light cannot change how minimal the effect could possibly be, as indicated by pre-existing data.

[OngBonga]

Isn't QM just like playing poker with an unknwon but clearly immense number of cards, and the only way to figure out how many cards there are is to keep playing until we have a massive enough sample size to make our best guess?

In 7.5 million years someone will say it's 42 cards, and there will be much lulz.

[OngBonga]

As for free will, well you either choose to believe that you're in control of your decisions, or you don't choose to believe it was all set in motion when the big bang happened, because you didn't make the choice to think that. Whatever makes you sleep better at night, I guess.

[boost]

The sense I meant it is "no obvious place to rest the claim [...]" should be replaced with "indication [...] is not the case."

It's poorly worded. I almost changed it days ago, but no one was calling me out on it, so I guessed that it wasn't as misleading as I was reading it.

The metaphor of a claim resting on a foundation of evidence is pretty standard, no? But yeah, I suppose I could have been a lot clearer.

[boost]

Hmm.

quantum probability (if that's a phrase) is being posited as a potential source of freewill.

If there is anything acting on matter/energy wave/particles, then QM has some predictions to make about it. IF those predictions don't need to be altered AND free will exists, THEN sure, the quirkiness of quarks is likely the cause, BUT, that means free will does not mean an ability to change particle interactions. So if we can't affect anything on the smallest scales, then what is free will? That's a new question, not the original question.


If you need to reach outside of the quarks doing quirky things to say that some other phenomenon is influencing the probability of which quirky thing they do

We don't; every known experiment is in line with the current theory. There is no need to invoke any further axioms to explain the current data (for physics in brains... not quantum-relativistic stuff). If new data comes to light, then we'll re-evaluate at that time, but whatever new discovery needs to be explained can't change the current data. The current data is showing no evidence that QM is incorrect (incomplete, but nowhere incorrect). Whatever new data comes to light cannot change how minimal the effect could possibly be, as indicated by pre-existing data.

Ok, yeah, now I'm really lost. I think we might be talking passed each other.

Do you think there is freewill or not, and if so, from where do you think it arises?

[MadMojoMonkey]

Ok, yeah, now I'm really lost. I think we might be talking passed each other.

Do you think there is freewill or not, and if so, from where do you think it arises?

I think I feel like I make decisions and affect change in myself,
despite the growing wealth of evidence that suggests that is not true,
but it doesn't matter whether or not we have free will,
because humans aren't well served to abandon the notion of personal responsibility.

Put another way:
I think that if humans have free will, i.e. personal agency, it is not what we think it is in our everyday lives,
but that I will have a lot of bad days if I act like I am not responsible for my actions.

[MadMojoMonkey]

The metaphor of a claim resting on a foundation of evidence is pretty standard, no? But yeah, I suppose I could have been a lot clearer.

Your wording was fine. It was mine that I was criticizing.

[MadMojoMonkey]

Isn't QM just like playing poker with an unknwon but clearly immense number of cards, and the only way to figure out how many cards there are is to keep playing until we have a massive enough sample size to make our best guess?

No. Maybe 50+ years ago when Einstein was digging his heels in about it, but not since the data started coming in confirming it.

QM is the most precisely confirmed theory ever put forth by humans. Nothing new can change what data we already have. Our current theory explains the data up to some astounding limits. Whatever new explanations need to preserve the accuracy of our current explanations, in order to match the data.

IDK if I followed you, but it's more like QM says there are 52 cards in the deck, and current data indicates there are 52 +/- 10^-15 cards in the deck. We're hoping to have that pinned down to 52 +/- 10^-18 in the coming years, as technology develops.